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Defense Supplementals and the Budget Process
JERRY McCAFFERY and PAUL GODEK
Supplemental appropriations provide emergency adjustments to the current
year, usually for national defense contingencies and natural disaster
emergencies. Recently, they have adopted some of the complexities of the
regular appropriation process. For example, both the president and Congress
may suggest when a supplemental is a dire emergency and thus beyond spending
discipline and when it must be offset. Some supplementals have paid for
nonemergency activities, others have resulted in funding decreases, and still
others have resulted in spending in future years. Compared to the normal
appropriation process, supplementals are usually passed expeditiously. Defense
supplementals are generally precisely priced, whereas disaster supplementals
tend to be lump sum estimates.
INTRODUCTION
Supplemental appropriations provide funding supplements for the current ﬁscal year,
over and above funding provided in the regular appropriation process. In the 1990s, the
major focus of supplementals has been to meet emergent needs resulting from
disasters and defense concerns. As the budget year unrolls, unpredictable events occur.1
Some of these are met by transfers or reprogramming of dollars already appropriated,
but others are of such a magnitude that only an additional appropriation will
sufﬁce. Supplemental appropriations ﬁll these needs. This essay is about the new
complexities of supplemental appropriations. Supplementals are an old tool, but
deﬁcit-limiting procedures mainly stemming from the Budget Enforcement Act of
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1. For more on budget execution, see Jerry McCaffery and John Mutty, ‘‘The Hidden Process in
Budgeting: Budget Execution,’’ in Public Budgeting, Accounting, and Financial Management (Summer
1999): 233–258; and J. McCaffery and L. R. Jones, ‘‘Budget Execution,’’ in Budgeting and Financial
Management in the Federal Government (Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing, 2001), 149–182.
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19902 have changed the use of supplementals. We examine some of these changes by
focusing on defense supplementals to explore the relationship between departmental
administration and supplemental appropriations. Our data are drawn from interviews
with budget analysts and comptrollers in the Department of Defense and the
Department of Navy and from Congressional records.
PURPOSES OF SUPPLEMENTALS
Supplemental appropriations may provide for natural disaster aid to states, regions, and
directly to individuals for blizzards, ﬂoods, drought, ﬁres, and hurricanes. Supplementals
provided assistance in the northeast blizzard of 1978, the Mount St. Helens eruption in
1980, Hurricane Hugo and the Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989, Hurricanes Andrew and
Iniki and the Chicago ﬂood and the Los Angeles riots in 1992, the Northridge (Los
Angeles) earthquake in 1994, and ﬂooding in the Dakotas in 1998.
Supplementals met emergent military missions in the 1990s beginning with the Gulf
War in 1991 and Bosnia in 1996 and thereafter.3 In addition to military missions, the
Department of Defense (DOD) has also been tasked with providing aid in time of
disaster to foreign nations. For example, from 1990 to 1997, U.S. naval forces
participated in 50 major disaster missions. The duration of 12 of these operations lasted
more than two years. Refugee support missions averaged over 3.6 annually, peaking at
eight concurrent operations in 1994. There were 17 natural disaster missions from 1990
to 1993. Between 1993 and 1997, 15 peacekeeping missions were undertaken. During the
1990s, the Navy evacuated embassy personnel from Liberia, Somalia, and Zaire; assisted
refugees from Iraq, Cuba, China, Panama, and Rwanda; helped ﬁght disease in
Venezuela; helped people recover from storms in Antigua, the Philippines, Guam,
Bangladesh, and the Bahamas; provided earthquake relief in the Philippines and Guam;
aided the drought stricken in Micronesia and Somalia; coped with volcanic eruptions in
the Philippines and Italy; and was involved with peacekeeping operations in Bosnia,
Somalia, Liberia, Ecuador, and Haiti.4 Supplemental appropriations provided the
2. For more on the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, see Richard Doyle and Jerry McCaffery, ‘‘The
Budget Enforcement Act after One Year,’’ Public Budgeting & Finance 12, no. 1 (Spring 1992): 3–22; and
Richard Doyle and Jerry L. McCaffery, ‘‘The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990FThe Path to No-Fault
Budgeting,’’ Public Budgeting & Finance 11, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 25–41.
3. For background and analysis of supplemental appropriations, see the series of reports issued by the
Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (CBO), including ‘‘Supplemental Operations in the 1970s’’; ‘‘Supplemental
Operations in the 1980s’’; and ‘‘Supplemental Appropriations in the 1990s.’’ The most recent versions may
be found on the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce web page, available from: http://www.cbo.gov. For a state
perspective, see the testimony of Theresa A. Gullo, Chief, State and Local Government Cost Estimates
Unit, Congressional Budget Ofﬁce, on ‘‘How States Budget and Plan for Emergencies’’ before the House
Budget Committee, 23 June 1998.
4. E. D. McGrady, Peacemaking, Complex Emergencies and Disaster Response: What Happens, How Do
You Respond ? (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, 1999), 155–156.
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wherewithal to help fund some of these missions; those of a smaller scale were absorbed
within the DOD budget. Although not much is made of it, in the 1990s DOD became a
sort of emergency response force, fulﬁlling a variety of police, ﬁre, and emergency rescue
functions when tasked to do so by the president with the concurrence of Congress.
Agencies other than defense also executed supplementals in international programs.
As a result of Hurricane Mitch in November of 1999, USAID administered $587 million
worth of supplemental-funded relief efforts for water and sanitation projects in
Honduras, road and bridge repair in Guatemala, housing rehabilitation in the
Dominican Republic, and water and sanitation projects in Nicaragua. The Inspector
General’s Ofﬁce for USAID monitored these projects for completion on time and on
budget, to guard against fraud and abuse, and to ascertain whether the host government
followed USAID competition requirements in bidding and contract management.
According to Everett Mosley, the USAID Inspector General, his auditors helped
contractors and grantees set up and recalibrate work plans and create fund accounting
systems.5 This is an example of where a supplemental aimed at disaster relief also carried
with it capacity-building technology, and a value system and technical assistance to get
the work done on schedule and without losing funds to corruption, fraud, and misuse.
Thus, funds from supplementals have been spent both in and outside the United States as
policymakers have reacted to events suddenly thrust upon them, to provide direct aid
and sometimes to help the other country build technical capacity that would be of beneﬁt
to it in the future.
THE SUPPLEMENTAL PROCESS
Before the passage of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Reform Act of 1974,
the federal government regularly used supplementals for provision of funding for day-to-
day agency operations such as pay raises for federal employees, but in recent years,
supplementals have been mainly used ‘‘to provide funding for unanticipated expenses
Falthough there is sometimes an argument about whether the requirements should have
been anticipated or not.’’6 The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of
1974 attempted to control the use of supplementals, by providing that expected
supplementals be included in the president’s budget and that an allowance be set aside
in the budget resolution for anticipated supplementals. The Budget Enforcement Act of
1990 imposed spending caps on federal spending, which meant that a supplemental that
exceeded the cap could only be passed if it could be matched with an offsetting spending
reduction or revenue increase, or if it were deemed to be a dire emergency supplemental, in
which case it would simply be funded out of deﬁcit spending.
5. Statement of Everett L. Mosley, Inspector General, USAID, before the House Committee on
Appropriations, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, 21 March 2001.
6. M. Tyszkiewicz and S. Daggett, A Defense Budget Primer (Washington, DC: Congressional Research
Service, Library of Congress, 1998), 42–43.
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During the 1990s, Congress and the president tried to offset supplementals with
rescissions or cancellations of budget authority provided in earlier appropriation bills
that had not been obligated or had been deemed unnecessary. An examination of the
1990s indicates that rescissions made an impact on supplementals, but only in 1995 were
rescissions large enough to offset supplementals. In fact, in that year, rescissions
exceeded the amount appropriated for supplementals.7 Rescissions were enacted in every
year from 1990 through 1999, amounting to $51.97 billion. Supplementals enacted
amounted to $137.99 billion, and thus the net cost of the supplementals for the decade
was $86 billion.8 Because rescissions did not pay for all supplemental costs, the dire
emergency provision also had to be used. During the 1990s, most supplementals were
passed under the dire emergency clause and thus avoided spending cap discipline. No
such escape clause existed prior to 1990, but in every year from 1991 through 1999 part
or all of the supplementals passed were designated emergencies.
The executive branch controls the timing of when the supplemental will be submitted
to Congress and its initial size. The president may also suggest billpayers (the bill is an
emergency, but not a dire emergency) or ask for dire emergency designation. Congress
must concur. Emergency designation is a shared power. Congress can add projects and
funds to both supplementals and regular appropriations and suggest that they be
considered for emergency designation. Congress routinely did this over the decade of the
1990s, originating about 33 percent of the dollars designated as emergencies.9 The
president has to ofﬁcially accept Congress’s designation of the funds as emergency before
the dollars may be released for obligation.
Between 1993 and 1995, Congress was unwilling to grant the full amount of
supplemental appropriations requested by the president. After 1996, Congress generally
provided more than the president requested. Whereas Congress’s overall supplemental
spending in the 1990s ($137.99 billion) was slightly larger than the president’s requests
($131.6 billion), Congress was also willing to offer up more rescissions than the president:
the amount of total rescissions enacted by Congress was almost three times that
requested by the president ($52 billion compared to $18 billion).10
In the 26 years from 1974 through 1999, 61 supplemental appropriations were
enacted, totaling more than $430 billion dollars, as shown in Table 1.11 This is an average
7. The supplemental in 1995 was enacted for $6.42 billion; rescissions enacted amounted to $18.94
billion. Congressional Budget Ofﬁce, ‘‘Supplemental Appropriations in the 1990s’’ (March 2001), 10.
8. These data in this paragraph were drawn from Congressional Budget Ofﬁce, ‘‘Supplemental
Appropriations and Rescissions,’’ in ‘‘Supplemental Appropriations in the 1990s’’ (March 2001), Table 2: 10.
9. Computed from CBO, ‘‘Emergency Funding under the Budget Enforcement Act: An Update’’ (8
June 1999), Table 2: 4.
10. CBO, ‘‘Supplemental Appropriations in the 1990s’’ (March 2001), Table 2: 10.
11. These data were drawn from the annual volumes of the Congressional Quarterly Almanac,
Washington, DC, volumes 30–54 (1974–1999). Also see Table 4.1, ‘‘Supplemental Appropriations, 1974–
1999,’’ in Paul Godek, ‘‘Emergency Supplemental Appropriations: A Department of Defense Perspective,’’
Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA (December 2000).
Public Budgeting & Finance / Summer 200356
TABLE 1









1974 179 82,600 0.000% 0.000%
1974 4.75 0.000% 0.000%
1974 8.77 2.14 24.401% 0.003%
1974 8.66 0.000% 0.000%
1975 638 90,500 0.000% 0.000%
1975 143.2 0.000% 0.000%
1975 15,070 256.3 1.701% 0.283%
1975 10,300 0.000% 0.000%
1976 18,000 97,567 0.000% 0.000%
1976 9,400 0.000% 0.000%
1976 872 0.000% 0.000%
1976 2,140 0.000% 0.000%
1977 200 110,362 0.000% 0.000%
1977 28,900 101.1 0.350% 0.092%
1978 6,800 514.8 117,349 7.571% 0.439%
1978 80.5 0.000% 0.000%
1978 250.2 0.000% 0.000%
1978 300 0.000% 0.000%
1978 7,800 423.8 5.433% 0.361%
1979 13,800 2,900 126,880 21.014% 2.286%
1980 40 144,502 0.000% 0.000%
1980 7.6 0.000% 0.000%
1980 3,800 0.000% 0.000%
1980 16,900 0.000% 0.000%
1981 20,900 6,900 180,443 33.014% 3.824%
1981 11,800 0.000% 0.000%
1982 2,300 0.000%
1982 5,000 217,179 0.000% 0.000%
1982 14,200 435 3.063% 0.200%
1982 5,400 0.000% 0.000%
1983 24,300 244,972 0.000% 0.000%
1983 7,000 469.8 6.711% 0.192%
1983 4,600 0.000% 0.000%
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1984 290 265,584 0.000% 0.000%
1984 6,180 332 5.372% 0.125%
1984 1,150 0.000% 0.000%
1985 13,020 294,853 0.000% 0.000%
1985 784 0.000%
1986 1,500 289,625 0.000% 0.000%
1986 5,300 0.000%
1986 1,700 0.000%
1987 9,400 720 287,960 7.660% 0.250%
1988 672 292,497 0.000% 0.000%
1988 709 0.000%
1989 3,300 2,400 300,067 72.727% 0.800%
1990 4,300 303,946 0.000% 0.000%
1991 42,600 42,600 332,228 100.000% 12.823%
1991 3,700 0.000%
1991 6,900 0.000%
1992 1,100 299,115 0.000% 0.000%
1992 11,100 4,100 36.937% 1.371%
1993 4,000 276,109 0.000% 0.000%
1993 3,500 0.000%
1993 5,700 0.000%
1994 13,855 1,497 262,246 10.805% 0.571%
1995 3,100 262,862 0.000% 0.000%
1996 5,051 982 265,014 19.442% 0.371%
1997 8,900 2,100 266,217 23.596% 0.789%
1998 6,100 2,800 272,370 45.902% 1.028%
1998 20,800 1,859 8.938% 0.683%
1999 14,500 10,900 288,117 75.172% 3.783%
$430,354 $82,293 $5,971,164 19.122% 1.378%
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of $7.05 billion per supplemental and $16.5 billion per year. The largest emergency
supplemental was for the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and totaled $42.6 billion.12
Conversely, in 1974, a supplemental was passed for $4.75 million.13 Twenty
supplementals were passed from 1974 through 1979, including ﬁve in 1978 alone. More
recent practice, due to attempts to hold down spending to curb the deﬁcit and perhaps as
a result of fewer natural disasters, has seen fewer bills passed each year; only one
supplemental was passed in each of 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1999. Starting with the Gulf
War supplementals, emergent military missions often made the defense portion of the
supplemental a key policy issue where the debate focused not only on funding but also on
the president’s responsibility to inform Congress before engaging in certain peacekeeping
missions. In 1991, 1992, and 1999 (and 2000), defense needs constituted more than half
of the supplemental bills. Over the 26-year period, the Gulf War supplemental was the
only bill of 61 that was dedicated 100 percent to defense. Twenty of the 61 bills had some
money for defense in them; the defense portion amounted to 19.1 percent of total
supplemental spending over the 26-year period and 6.5 percent if the Gulf War
supplemental is set aside. Compared to cumulative defense spending from 1974 through
1999, cumulative defense supplemental amounts are negligible, amounting to about
1.38 percent of total defense spending over the 26-year period.14
In the 1990s, after the DOD, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
was the second largest recipient of discretionary supplementals, receiving substantial
amounts of supplemental budget authority in every year of the decade except 1991 to
total $22.1 billion. That amount primarily represents appropriations to FEMA’s disaster
relief account to pay for relief efforts in the wake of hurricanes, ﬂoods, earthquakes, and
droughts. Other agencies that received substantial amounts of supplemental budget
authority included the Departments of Agriculture, Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), and Transportation. DOD and HUD received supplemental funding every year
from 1991 on. HUD’s funds were generally for assisted housing or community
development block grants. FEMA received supplementals from 1992 on, for disaster
relief and disaster assistance loans. From 1992 on, the Small Business Administration
also received funding for disaster loans, as did the Commodity Credit Corporation for
aid to farmers for crop losses. In 1999, funds were also provided to compensate farmers
through price supports for certain commodities.15
12. Two other supplementals were passed that year totaling just over $1 billion. See Godek, Table 4.1:
36.
13. Two more small supplementals were passed in 1974, one for $8.77 million and another for $8.66
million. See Godek, Table 4.1: 36.
14. Godek, ‘‘Desert Storm Supplemental Analysis’’, Table 4.2: 37.
15. CBO, ‘‘Supplemental Appropriations in the 1990s,’’ 17.
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SUPPLEMENTALS PASS QUICKLY
Supplementals allow the federal government to show that it is willing and able to
respond to urgent needs, both at home and abroad, and that it is capable of doing so
quickly. This is a useful corrective to the regular appropriation process, which is often in
a state of gridlock and where appropriation bills are usually late. Supplementals have a
clear seasonal distribution. In most years, Congress introduces and passes supplementals
within a four-month period, usually in the late winter and spring, as shown in Table 2.16
From 1974 through 1999, 38 of the 61 supplemental bills passed during this period were
introduced in February (12), March (13), or May (13). Eight bills were introduced from
August through January. The last of these occurred in 1983; since then, no supplemental
bills had been introduced and passed in the August through January time frame until the
September 2001 supplemental stimulated by the terrorist attack on the U.S.
In general, supplementals are passed quickly: 50.8 percent were introduced, passed,
and signed in two months and 86.8 percent (53 of 61 bills) were passed within four
months over the 26-year period, as shown in Table 3.17 The average duration was a little
over three months and only eight took longer than four months. Over the 26-year period,
only three supplementals took eight months or longer. One of these, the supplemental
passed in May of 1980, had been in process for 12 months. This was the longest duration
supplemental. At the other extreme, seven bills took one month or less, from
introduction to signing.
This may not seem particularly quick, but the passage of normal appropriation bills
can take up to ten months from introduction to passage, or longer. The great budget
debacle of 1995–1996 saw the last Omnibus Appropriation Bill for 1996 passed in April
of 1996, 14 months after the Congressional budget process for that year had begun and
seven months into the then current ﬁscal year.
SUPPLEMENTALS AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION
When the president decides to evacuate embassy staff or rescue American citizens or
deploy troops in an emergent peacekeeping action or deploy defense forces in a
humanitarian enterprise, he creates an unbudgeted expense for the defense budget. The
president authorizes action by the DOD, which executes the mission using whatever tools
and personnel are at hand. If the mission is small and very limited, the expense may be
absorbed within the DOD budget. For larger, more extensive missions, DOD executes
the mission and pays for it by ‘‘borrowing’’ against its fourth-quarter supporting expense
budget, the operations and maintenance account. DOD then depends on Congress to
pass a supplemental appropriation early enough in the summer so that whatever was
16. Godek, ‘‘Appendix: Legislative Tracking of Supplemental Appropriations’’, 47.
17. These observations and the table below are summarized from ibid.
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borrowed can be replaced, and the original fourth-quarter spending program can be
executed as planned. Conventionally, if the mission happens in the fall or winter of the
year, the DOD comptroller, with OMB’s permission, waits to submit the supplemental
until after the budget process has begun in the following spring, so that Congress does
not confuse the supplemental needs with those asked for in the regular appropriation
TABLE 2
Supplemental Tracking Proﬁle, 1974–1999
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INTRODUCED /CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
CONFERENCE REPORT APPROVAL/ PRESIDENT SIGNED
INTRODUCED, APPROVED AND SIGNED BY PRESIDENT
Source: Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1974–1999.
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bill.18 This usually means that because the regular Congressional budget process begins
in February, the defense supplemental may be submitted in late March or April for
events that happened the previous fall or winter.
DOD and Incremental Costs
With the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, the DOD was directed to report only the
incremental costs of carrying out contingency or emergency operations. This was
clariﬁed in 1995 and extended in February of 2001 to incremental costs ‘‘above and
beyond baseline training operations, and personnel costs.’’19 Thus, the military
departments may identify incremental costs related to military and civilian pay, clothing
and equipment, reserve activation, operational training, supplies and equipment,
facilities and base support, and airlift, sealift, and inland transportation. Before this
detailed guidance, each department had great latitude in developing incremental costs.
Historically, DOD has tended to absorb the costs of very small missions. The
incremental cost doctrine has increased this tendency; thus, there are missions where an
incremental cost bill could be speciﬁed, but DOD decides to absorb it because the cost of
the mission is small enough that absorbing it does no serious harm to the defense budget.
There are occasions where diverting personnel and ships from training exercises for a
small short-term rescue mission does not cost much and the actual activity might be close
enough to the training mission to provide a training beneﬁt, albeit reduced. It is also a
fact of life that the president is not going to ask for, nor will Congress provide, funding
for such small missions. For the larger and more elaborate peacekeeping and
humanitarian missions, incremental costs are priced and the OMB comptroller, in
essence, submits the bill to Congress as part of the annual supplemental appropriation
request. It is clear that the incremental pricing requirement has resulted in more precise
TABLE3








7 24 14 8
7/61 (11.4%) 31/61 (50.8%) 45/61 (73.7%) 53/61 (86.8%)
Source: Computed from Table 2.
Note: Percentages are cumulative.
18. In theory, the supplemental is for work already done, and is a one-time expenditure. Funds whose
purpose is to improve the budget base permanently should be provided in regular appropriations. The
extent to which this expectation is violated is a subject for future research.
19. Department of Defense Financial Management Regulations, vol. 12, chapter 23: 23–26.
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pricing of defense supplementals. It may also have resulted in a slight decrease in total
costs, as DOD absorbs small incremental costs rather than asking for their
reimbursement, especially small operations that can be considered similar to baseline
training exercises.
DOD Supplementals: Pay-as-You-Go and Dire Emergency Status
DOD supplementals were affected by the pay-as-you-go provisions of the Budget
Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA) and subsequently. BEA required that spending above
the allowable spending caps be deﬁcit neutral, meaning that either a revenue source had
to be found or funding taken from another program through a rescission. This program,
then, would become the billpayer. Or, the president could ask that the supplemental be
classiﬁed as a dire emergency; if Congress concurred, the supplemental amount would be
relieved of the billpayer necessity and the allowable spending cap would, in effect, be
increased. Also, beginning in 1991, the emergency designation was used for some funds
in regular appropriation bills. Consequently, by the end of the decade, the result of this
process was rather large supplemental appropriation bills, with a mix of emergency and
nonemergency funding, and regular appropriations with emergency funding in them.
Designation of part of a supplemental as emergency is a further complication, as is the
mixing of the emergency designation into regular appropriation bills. Moreover,
sometimes the emergency funding lasts for more than one year, and thus a supplemental
with emergency funding could affect not only the current year, but the next year as well.
In fact, this is what happened in 1999 when the emergency supplemental enacted on May
21, 1999, carried funds not only for 1999, but also for 2000. Most of the nearly $2 billion
for 2000 was for military pay and retirement.20 These are items that would seem to ﬁt
well into the normal appropriation bill; moreover, they also are an ongoing expense that
becomes part of the budget base, as opposed to a one-time emergency. Using emergency
supplementals in this manner tends to confuse an already complex budget process.
Critics have argued that the obvious solution is to put the second year of emergency
funding in the regular appropriation bill. Others observe that when spending caps are set
unrealistically low, spending is deemed emergency spending simply to get around the
caps, and that more realistic caps would lead to fewer or smaller supplementals and less
emergency spending.21
20. CBO, ‘‘Emergency Spending under BEA, An Update,’’ 8 June 1999: 2. In 1999, $21.4 billion of
emergency spending was also included in regular appropriations, a further confusion of the process.
21. The budgetary politics of the 1990s was a history of spending caps ﬁrst imposed from 1990 through
1995 with the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 and then extended in 1993 and 1997, for a ﬁve-year period
through 2002. The net effect of these caps was to put the discretionary sector of the budget under very tight
discipline, so that budget growth was capped at less than inﬂation for most agencies. From 1995 to 1996,
discretionary budget authority fell by $12 billion and the caps set in the 1997 budget agreement for the years
out to 2002 were quite tight (CBO, ‘‘Supplementals in the 1990s’’ (2001), 12). Without a concomitant
decrease in the discretionary tasks of the federal government, these tight caps were an open invitation to
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With an ordinary supplemental, one not deemed a ‘‘dire’’ emergency, the president
and Congress have to ﬁnd funding sources to pay for the bill. This could mean sources
inside or outside the defense budget. A billpayer outside the defense budget, say surplus
money in the food stamp account, means that the supplemental would be funded outside
defense. Sometimes DOD is required to come up with a portion of the supplemental
from DOD funds. For example, in some years Congress has authorized a pay raise and
funded only half the increase, asking DOD to ﬁnd money for the rest of it. In the Navy
budget, these offsets might come from delaying property maintenance or ship repair and
overhauls, categories where spending could be delayed into the next ﬁscal year without
too much damage to program execution. Notice that in these cases, DOD and Congress
are, in effect, cost sharing the supplemental. Congress uses this technique to drive down
the cost of the supplemental. Thus, even though the supplemental has been accurately
priced, Congress may refuse to pay the whole bill and require a contribution from DOD,
which, on its part, may borrow against the future by delaying construction or
maintenance programs already funded in the budget into the future. These items won
approval through the executive budget process and in Congress, but now they may be
forced to recompete for approval. In effect, the supplemental has forced a cut in
currently approved programs and put them in jeopardy again. For DOD, the cost
sharing solves one problem in the present, but creates future budgetary needs. Congress,
for its part, has a series of choices to make, that is, fully fund or cost share, ﬁnd billpayers
to provide rescissions, or declare all or part of the bill a ‘‘dire emergency.’’ A mixed
approach is possible. For example, the 1999 supplemental was a hybrid; it was offset by
$1.7 billion, mainly from the food stamp account, and the rest of the $15 billion was
called a dire emergency.
Conventional wisdom suggests that dire emergency status is only used for
supplemental bills, but this is not true. In order to escape spending cap restrictions, all
of the supplementals passed in 1991 were designated as dire emergency spending, but so
was an additional $1 billion of regular appropriations. Using the dire emergency
designation to avoid spending cap discipline in the regular appropriation bills set a
precedent that was embraced throughout the decade. The use of the dire emergency
designation for regular appropriations occurred every year, ranging from $314 million in
1992 to $2.1 billion in 1997.22 This may be seen both as an evasion of budget discipline
and as a safety valve, particularly because the amounts were generally a very small
percentage of the total budget. Whatever the justiﬁcation, because the mechanism was
available, Congress decided to use it. In 1999, $21.4 billion was designated emergency
spending in the regular appropriation bills, indicating a rather large breakdown in
escape onerous and tight discipline through the supplemental appropriations escape hatch. The caps, a
surplus in 1998, and electoral positioning for the year 2000 election resulted in large supplemental
appropriations, of $13.3 billion in 1999 and $22 billion in 2000.
22. The numbers in this discussion are drawn from Table 1, ‘‘Overview of Emergency Spending, 1991–
2000’’ in CBO, ‘‘Emergency Spending under the Budget Enforcement Act: An Update’’, 8 June 1999: 2.
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budget discipline, resulting from a budget surplus and rather tight spending caps. An
additional $12.9 billion was designated as emergency spending in the supplemental bill
for that year, but the argument can be made that this is proper because the primary
purpose of supplementals is to fund emergencies.
Logically, it would seem improper to include emergency-designated funds in regular
appropriation bills, which are, after all, for the following ﬁscal year.23 Whereas the
emergency-designated sums are very small compared to the total budget, the emergency
designation device is rather widely used among appropriation subcommittees and in
agency appropriation bills. For example, in 1999, whereas Defense was the largest
beneﬁciary of the emergency designation, 12 appropriation subcommittees had some
emergency money within their purview (only the District of Columbia failed to beneﬁt)
and 18 cabinet level agencies gained dollars through the emergency designation process,
with NASA, Veterans Affairs, and the Department of Education being overlooked in
this year. (NASA was the only agency never to receive emergency-designated money in
the 1990s).24 How this trend develops needs to be monitored.
Both the president and Congress originated emergency-designated money from 1991
to 2000. Over the period, about $146 billion was designated as emergency money in both
supplementals and regular appropriations. The president took the lead in asking for the
emergency designation from 1991 through 1995, asking for 81 percent of the emergency
funds during this period, with Congress leading from 1996 through 2000, asking for 56
percent of the funds designated as emergency money.25 This is a reﬂection of the great
struggle between the Republican Congress and President Clinton over the budget in the
latter years of the decade.
The temptation is to say that Congress and the president learned over the decade how
to get around the spending cap discipline by designating some funding in regular
appropriation bills as emergency funding, but the fact is that $1 billion of regular
appropriation money was designated as emergency in 1991, thus illustrating that the
president and Congress understood the mechanism in 1991 and used it. It also must be
said that when supplementals pass early in the session, as most of them do, and with the
tendency in the 1990s to pass only one supplemental, and considering that Congress does
not get serious about its budget work until August, September, or later, the ability to
designate dollars in regular appropriation bills for emergency purposes presents a
convenient safety valve. However, it complicates our understanding of the supplemental
appropriation process when emergencies are found in regular appropriation bills and
23. Because most appropriation bills are passed after the start of the ﬁscal year, Congress does have an
opportunity to address emergency needs within current appropriation bills. This may help explain the rise
of this practice as well as why supplementals are generally a spring and summer phenomenon.
24. Table 2, ‘‘Emergency Spending, 1991–2000’’ in CBO, ‘‘Overview of Emergency Spending’’, 1991–
2000. CBO, ‘‘Emergency Spending under the Budget Enforcement Act: An Update’’, 8 June 1999: 3. This
table shows spending by agency and by appropriations subcommittee.
25. Computed from Table 2, CBO, ‘‘Emergency Funding under the Budget Enforcement Act: An
Update,’’ 8 June 1999: 3.
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nonemergencies in supplemental bills (e.g., maintenance, spare parts, and family housing
funding in the defense supplementals in 1998 and 1999).26 It also impairs the
transparency of the budgetary process.
SUPPLEMENTAL HISTORY
Supplemental spending bills are not new. The use of supplemental appropriations began
with the second session of the ﬁrst Congress in 179027 and continued in the 1800s. They
frequently included additional appropriations for agencies that had overspent their
appropriations, and as such became known as deﬁciency appropriations. This practice
became so routine that the House Appropriations committee divided them into general
deﬁciency bills and urgent deﬁciency bills. In the 1870s, when antideﬁciency legislation
was passed, critics of this process accused Congress of underfunding the regular
appropriation bills to appear frugal stewards of public funds, and then, ‘‘after elections
were over, make up the necessary amounts by deﬁciency bills.’’28 The Antideﬁciency Act
of 1905 attempted to control deﬁciency spending by giving the Treasury Department the
authority to apportion funds to agencies to reduce the need for supplementals. This
power was further reﬁned by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 and the
Antideﬁciency Act of 1950, which encouraged agencies to set aside reserve funds for
emergencies, and limited supplemental appropriations to legislation enacted after the
president’s budget had been submitted and for emergencies relating to the preservation
of human life and property.29 However, the issues surrounding supplementals have
remained contentious. In 1966, the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress
again raised the issue of lawmakers projecting an image of economy by underfunding the
regular appropriation bills with the tacit understanding that they would later pass
supplemental appropriation bills.30
In the 1970s, supplementals primarily affected mandatory accounts such as
unemployment beneﬁts and increased food stamp funding. In 1977, discretionary
programs were supplemented with a $9.5 billion program for job training to counteract
the recession of 1973–1975. Most of the other supplementals for the 1970s were for
federal pay raises, programs that were authorized after their appropriation bill had been
passed, and expenses related to natural disasters such as blizzards, ﬂoods, droughts, and
forest ﬁres. Supplementals declined in the 1980s, to a low of 0.1 percent of budget
authority in 1988, mostly as a result of the struggle with the deﬁcit and the requirement
26. In these years, DOD argued that these categories had been underfunded so long that DOD now
faced an emergency situation. Congress concurred.
27. CBO, ‘‘Supplemental Appropriations in the 1990s’’ (March 2001), 1.
28. James Garﬁeld, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee in 1879, ‘‘Supplemental
Appropriations in the 1990s’’ (March 2001), 1.
29. CBO, ‘‘Supplemental Appropriations in the 1990s’’ (March 2001), 2.
30. CBO, ‘‘Supplemental Appropriations in the 1990s’’ (March 2001), 2.
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for offsets to pay for supplementals. Mandatories were again high: two thirds of the
supplementals in this decade were for mandatory payments, primarily for support of
farm commodity programs as a result of worse than expected conditions in farm
commodity markets. Supplementals also were applied to the food stamp program,
unemployment insurance, and various higher education programs. In the 1990s, only 6.3
percent of all supplemental appropriations went to mandatory accounts.31 Most of the
discretionary supplemental appropriations in 1991 were for military operations
Desert Storm and Desert Shield. Domestic spending dominated discretionary
supplemental appropriations from 1993 to 1998, but defense spending reemerged as
the largest category in 1999 and 2000 because of peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and
Kosovo.
Academic research on supplementals has been sparse. In his classic The Politics of the
Budgetary Process and in subsequent revisions, Aaron Wildavsky mentions supple-
mentals, suggesting that ‘‘Congressmen get headlines for suggesting large cuts, but they
often do not follow through for they know that the amounts will have to be restored by
supplemental appropriations.’’32 Wildavsky observes that appropriations committee
members may even talk to agency ofﬁcials about areas they can cut and then restore later
in supplementals, but he does not pursue this. However, Christopher Wlezien does,
examining the relationship between appropriations and the supplemental process based
on data from 1950 through 1985. Wlezien found that regular appropriations and
supplemental appropriations were linked in a two-stage process, with certain accounts
underfunded in the regular appropriation bills and replenished through the supplemental
process. Wlezien associated these results with party identiﬁcation and found that
Republican presidents were more likely to engage in strategic underfunding and make it
up later with supplementals during the time period under study. Wlezien observed that
the two-stage process he discovered in the appropriation process from 1950 to 1985
occurs in a single stage in the early 1990s, with the politics of bargaining between the
president and Congress being ‘‘largely conﬁned to regular appropriations’’33 primarily as
a result of changes in the budget process. Observation of the 2000 and 2001
supplementals seems to indicate that supplementals and main appropriation bills each
have an arena for institutional bargaining; with supplementals the bargaining seems to
be about size, dire emergency designation, ﬁnding billpayers, and pork. Supplementals
have also been the locus of bargaining about the limits of executive power, with Congress
suggesting that the president must get advance approval from Congress before
engaging in peacekeeping operations and then presenting Congress with a bill for a
31. Mandatories amounted to $8.7 billion on a total of $137.993. CBO, ‘‘Supplemental Appropriations
in the 1990s’’ (March 2001), Table 2: 10.
32. Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964, 1984), 23; and
Naomi Caiden and Aaron Wildavsky, The New Politics of the Budgetary Process (New York: Addison
Wesley Longman, 1997), 50.
33. Christopher Wlezien, ‘‘The President, Congress, and Appropriations,’’ American Politics Quarterly,
24, no. 1 (January 1996): 43–67. See p. 62 for quote.
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fait accompli.34 Whereas these are topics for future research, we agree with Wlezien that
the old two-step process has largely disappeared.35
NONEMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTALS AND OFFSETS
When DOD had to offer up offsets in a nonemergency supplemental, the usual practice
was for the military departments to share equally, each coming up with one third of the
offset. If the costs of the mission are equal, this is fair for all. However, the military
departments have different structures, and in joint missions, one service might be able to
accomplish its mission more easily, and cheaply, than another service. If they all are
asked to offset the bill on an equal shares basis, a tradition within defense because all
share the pain equally, one military department may help pay for expenses in another.
For example, because the Navy is forward deployed, its costs may be less than Army and
Air Force, but, if it has to offer up a full third of the offset, the result could be that Navy
money will ﬂow to pay Air Force or Army bills. Suppose the total cost of the
supplemental is $6 billion, with the Navy share $400 million in incremental costs and the
Army and Air Force costs each being $2.8 billion. If Congress decides that DOD has to
offset this cost and the DOD comptroller asks each military department to offer up $2
billion in offsets, Navy would gain $400 from the supplemental but contribute $2 billion
to the offset for the supplemental; thus, Navy might have to cut its fourth-quarter
operational tempoFﬂying and steaming hoursFin order that the Army and Air Force
can more fully fund their fourth quarters. Much of this depends upon how DOD leaders,
including the comptroller, decide to allocate shares of the cost burden. For example, the
decision might be made to share the costs equally, or a differential cost pattern might be
imposed, taxing one military department more heavily than the others because budget
execution reports indicate that there is some slack in its budget due to program
underexecution.
Recovering true incremental costs is sometimes difﬁcult when the incremental cost is
small. For example, if ﬂying hours increase 3 percent over the normal yearly allotment as
a result of incremental costing related to emergencies, there is a tendency for the DOD
comptroller to urge the department to absorb it, because it is so small. This tendency is
even more apparent when it comes to incremental maintenance costs due to emergency
operations. As one source said: ‘‘If ﬂying hours go up 30,000 in a year due to a
contingency operation, that is a small number on a 1,000,000-hour ﬂying program.
Because we are out there ﬂying and steaming anyway, it is hard to argue for these small
34. For further discussion, see House Report No. 104–101, 104th Congress, 1st Session 25 (1995). Our
thanks to a Public Budgeting & Finance reviewer for drawing this to our attention.
35. Or perhaps should have disappeared; the defense spending supplementals of the latter years of the
1990s deserve a closer look; it appears that some of the items funded were continuing expenses and that the
pattern was for Congress and the president to hold to a tight cap for defense spending and then add money
through the emergency supplemental processFthe old two-stage process. Further research is indicated.
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percentage increases.’’ He added that absorbing costs was all right for the ships already
deployed, but the nondeployed units would not be getting enough training dollars to get
to the right readiness level unless the incremental costs of the emergency operation were
put back in the budget.
Whereas an emergency tasking cost might seem quite small as a percentage
of the overall defense budget, it is a much larger percentage of the billpaying
budget account. This is usually the fourth-quarter Operations and Maintenance
(O&M) account, where there is some room to change the pace of spending. For
example, in 1995, while Congress was debating a $2.5 billion supplemental, the Navy
comptroller’s ofﬁce calculated that this would be about 1 percent of the DOD budget, 3
percent of the DOD O&M budget, the usual billpayer for newly emergent military
missions, but 10 percent of ﬂexible O&M and 40 percent of fourth-quarter ﬂexible O&M,
as shown in Table 4. What this means is that if the money is not restored, a sizeable
amount of planned and budgeted program will go unexecuted, most of it in force
operations and direct support. Each quarter in the O&M account there are mandatory
expenses of a contractual or semicontractual nature, and these cannot be arbitrarily
foregone. There are also amounts that support troop exercises or training missions,
which have to go forward and be executed. Money cannot simply be ‘‘robbed’’ from
these accounts.
In 1995, the ﬂexible accounts comprised $27 billion of the $91 billion O&M budget. If
they were spread evenly over the four quarters, DOD would spend about $6.75 billion in
the fourth quarter. The $2.5 billion supplemental would comprise about 37 percent of
this amount. In these accounts where there is ﬂexibility, the military departments that
advance the money out of earlier quarters count on getting it back in the fourth quarter
in time to execute it as planned. This is not always a certainty. In 1998 the supplemental
bill was passed early in the spring, but the Ofﬁce of Secretary of Defense allowed only
about two thirds of it to ﬂow through to the Department of Navy while it went through a
rebudgeting process to see whether the Navy really needed the other one third. In 1999,
TABLE 4
Department of Defense FY1995 Operations and Maintenance Budget: $91 billion
No Flexibility $44b Limited Flexibility $20b Flexible $27b
Civilian pay/beneﬁts 23 Natl guard/ reserves 6 Optempoa 10
Health program 10 Contract services 5 Depot maintenance 5
Environmental costs 4 Drug interdiction 1 Support/transport 12
Utilities/rents 3 Recruiting/training 3
Mobilization/other 4 Support activities 5
Source: Personal interview.
aOptempo represents the series of accounts that provides funding for direct operations such as ﬂying and steaming
hours.
McCaffery & Godek / Defense Supplementals and the Budget Process 69
to help out with budget execution, DOD created a revolving fund to pay for emergency
actions. This appeared to be a promising approach, but it too had problems in estimating
proper reimbursement and getting the funds returned on a timely basis to the correct
source.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Supplementals are not like other appropriation bills. An appropriation bill is a forecast
of what is to come, a promise that x units of work will be accomplished with y dollars for
personnel and supporting expenses. However, no matter how carefully budget reviewers
labor over the numbers, the budget remains a forecast and the corresponding
appropriation is similarly imprecise. Supplementals, be they defense or disaster related,
are different. Disaster-focused supplementals are not like regular appropriation bills
because they are basically lump sum appropriations focused on a goal, remediation of
the disaster. The funding mix may resemble what was done for similar disaster situations
in the past, or it may be set up as what is recognized as an initial endowment with more
funding to follow, once the magnitude of the disaster is measured. Moreover, the
symbolism of governmental response to the crisis is important. The funding provided
may or may not be enough for the task; what it is designed to do is get aid to a problem
quickly, in the current ﬁscal year, in order to start the healing process. Rough estimates
of what will be necessary are made, but a disaster supplemental cannot have the careful
budget quality numbers that go into an appropriation request.
Defense-focused supplementals are different from both appropriation bills and
disaster-related supplementals. A defense-focused supplemental is unlike an appropria-
tion request because the defense supplemental is a statement of costs for services actually
performed. It is accurate and precise, much more precise than an appropriation bill can
be. Even the best appropriation estimate cannot have the accuracy of the defense
supplemental; after all, one is a forecast, the other is a bill for the incremental costs of
services rendered. Some defense supplementals have funded ongoing military activities
that last the duration of a ﬁscal year, or more. These are more like an appropriation bill
in their duration, but better than an appropriation in their precision. Moreover, the
defense supplemental with its itemized pricing and focus on incremental cost is at the
opposite end of the scale from the lump sum disaster supplemental; the former is
retrospective and pays for work already done, whereas the latter is prospective in
providing aid in a disaster situation.
The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 has changed the supplemental process by
requiring incremental costs and imposing deﬁcit control measures that involve spending
caps, billpayers, and/or dire emergency designation. These changes appear to have
changed the nature of supplementals as well as the supplemental process. Insofar as the
old two-step supplemental process is concerned, the budget ceilings set aside all a
functional area could receive for a year, so it would be a waste of time to underfund an
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area and expect to come back later and fund it in a supplemental; another program might
have used up the space under the ceiling in the meantime, and a sequestration36 could be
ordered for an appropriation that breaks the ceiling subsequently. Moreover, the Budget
Enforcement Act enforced a pay-as-you-go discipline after 1990 for supplementals not
designated as ‘‘dire emergencies.’’ Irrespective of the funding technique used, the
supplemental becomes a focus of attention, and coercive deﬁciency strategizing becomes
less likely, if not simply impracticable.
Supplementals result from unbudgeted and largely unpredicd events. They are small
compared to total budget spending, but they pay for what is needed in defense areas and
have great symbolic value both in defense and disaster relief. It was clear after the
terrorist attacks in September of 2001 that the American people expected their
government to protect them and help out with disaster relief. One way government can
show it is listening is by passing a supplemental appropriation. This was obvious in the
quick passage of the $40 billion supplemental for relief of the World Trade Center
disaster in two days in September of 2001.
Whereas the provisions of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 including caps,
billpayers, and incremental costing have made the supplemental process more
disciplined, negative results have also occurred. For example, the emergency designation
procedure has resulted in mixing emergency spending in regular bills and nonemergency
spending in supplemental bills. This impairs the transparency of the budgetary process.
A further complication occurs when a supplemental is not designated as a dire
emergency. In this case, some departments and programs will be used as billpayers and
will ﬁnd their programs decreased, not supplemented. If the money comes from an
underexecuting procurement or mandatory account and goes into permanent salaries as
a pay raise, not only will the salary account have to be increased in the following years,
but the original funds will probably have to be restored to the procurement or
mandatory program account. The net effect in future years may well be an increase all
around.
In summary then, there are some new aspects of supplemental appropriations to
consider. First, compared to the normal budget process, supplementals are usually
passed expeditiously. Second, contrary to popular perceptions, supplementals do not
always result in supplements. In fact, a supplemental package may result in a net
decrease due to offsets. Third, some supplemental bills may also supplement future year
budgets, an act commonly thought to lie in the province of future year appropriation
bills. Fourth, supplementals are commonly thought to be a tool the executive branch uses
to supplement budget authority to meet a current year need, but in practice Congress
36. One such across-the-board cut was ordered as a result of the supplemental that was passed on April
10, 1991 (PL 102-27), going into effect on April 25, 1991, and cutting all nonexempt accounts (by 0.0013
percent!). Supplementals that are passed before July 1 of the year and break a spending cap result in an
immediate sequestration. Supplementals passed after July 1 result in a sequestration against the spending
cap for the following year. The April, 1991 supplemental was the only supplemental in the 1990s found to
have breached a spending cap. See CBO, ‘‘Supplemental Spending in the 1990s’’ (March 2001), 5.7.
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may substantially increase the size and scope of the supplemental bill and may take the
lead in proposing the supplemental. Fifth, although supplementals are commonly
thought to be for emergency supplements for the current year, some supplementals are
aimed at nonemergency uses. Sixth, when supplementals are designated as dire
emergency bills, they escape the control of budget caps; Congress and the president
have found this such a convenient idea that the emergency designation has slipped into
use in regular appropriation bills. Seventh, though small compared to normal
appropriation bills, supplementals, especially in defense, meet 100 percent of the need.
This makes them a very efﬁcient vehicle. Finally, supplementals have great symbolic
importance, for they show an immediate governmental response to a current year crisis.
It would seem that supplementals deserve a little more attention than they currently earn
as a useful tool in the budgetary process.
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